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In light of the proliferation of exceptionally large fiscal 
stimuli to ward off the recession triggered by the 2008 
global economic and financial crisis in most advanced 
economies, this paper revisits the fiscal adjustment and 
growth nexus in Sub-Saharan Africa. Using transfer 
functions, it quantifies expected losses in terms of 
aggregate output largely attributed to a systematic 
implementation of pro-cyclical expenditure switching 
and reducing policies to achieve low deficit targets 
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of a larger effort in the department to understand the dynamics of fiscal adjustment and growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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throughout the decades of adjustments. The results 
consistently highlight a much higher predicted aggregate 
output under the hypothesized counter-cyclical fiscal 
expansion option. This consistent outcome suggests that 
the output gap would have been significantly smaller in 
the region if countries had drawn on stop-and-go policies 
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I. Introduction  
 
Until the outbreak of the 2008 global economic and financial crisis, which triggered the 
implementation of historically large fiscal stimulus packages in most advanced economies, fiscal 
adjustments—instances of sharp government budget deficits reduction—were the cornerstones of 
macroeconomic stabilization and growth. In effect, over the last three decades, fiscal deficit 
reductions have been at the heart of structural adjustment programs implemented in the majority 
of developing countries, confronted with either balance of payments crisis or internal disequilibria 
[IMF (1987), Stiglitz (2002)].2 In Sub-Saharan Africa where episodes of large fiscal and current 
account deficits abounded, the implementation of these deficit-reducing programs was particularly 
overwhelming, especially in the 1980s and 1990s.  
 
In most countries, these programs are primarily underpinned by a systematic implementation of 
contractionary policies characterized by expenditure switching and reducing measures. In part, 
these policies of drastic cuts in government spending are carried out to curtail public deficits and 
mitigate the macroeconomic costs of negative shocks [Rodrik (2006), Chang (2008)].3 While they 
resulted in a reduction of government deficits in numerous countries, they were also accompanied 
by significant economic costs, not least because the narrow tax base in the region limited the 
prospects for expanding the revenue side of government budgets, and attempts to raise revenues 
through higher taxes negatively affected investments and long-run economic growth.  
 
In practice, the economic costs of these deficit-reducing programs are broader and deeper across 
Sub-Saharan Africa. At the macroeconomic level, they are most notably illustrated by the dramatic 
fall in public investments and extremely high volatility of growth [Akyuz and Gore (2001), Artadi 
and Sala-i-Martin (2003)].4 At the same time, their social costs are equally felt by the majority of 
the population. A mid-term review of these programs in the 1990s suggested heightened social 
costs, which included a rapid deterioration of living standards and acceleration of poverty 
following rising unemployment rates in the face of public sector downsizing and retrenchment, 
and cuts in the delivery of basic social services [World Bank (1990)].5 
  
In effect, poverty rates increased dramatically in the 1980s, and have since persisted, with most 
countries in the region caught in poverty traps [Azariadis and Stachurski (2008), Fofack (2008)]. 
Despite the relative success at jugulating fiscal deficits and achieving macroeconomic stability 
within the framework of these programs, poverty rates remain extremely high in the region, with 
most countries expected to miss the first Millennium Development Goals of halving poverty by 
2015 [Berg and Qureshi (2005)].6 At the same time, income inequality has risen to record levels in 
the region [Sala-i-Martin (2002)].  
                                                      
2 Despite the transition from Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) to Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSP) in the late 1990s, fiscal adjustments remain the central piece of development assistance supported under 
the World Bank Poverty Reduction Support Credit and IMF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility. 
3 Deficit reduction is part of a set of policies which have underpinned structural adjustment programs. These 
policies have come to be commonly known as the Washington Consensus [Williamson (2000), Rodrik (2006)].  
4 In a trend reversal from sustained rates of investments in the immediate post-independence, public investments 
reached the all-time low average of 7.5% of GDP in the 1990s [Akyuz and Gore (2001)].  
5 The establishment of a new unit under the name “Social Dimensions of Adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa” 
within the World Bank in the 1990s is motivated by the high economic and social costs of these programs. 
6 In contrast, the reduction of poverty has been significant in other regions of the developing world, and most 
notably in the East Asia region [Berg and Qureshi (2005), Easterly (2007)].      3
 
Presumably, the emphasis on expenditure switching and reducing policies under these adjustment 
programs, in spite of their relatively high economic and social costs, reflects the hypothesized one-
to-one correspondence between economic growth and macroeconomic stability—reduction of  
fiscal deficits, low inflation and exchange rate volatility [IMF (1987), Ambler and Paquet (1996)]. 
However, over time, the deficit reduction objectives of these programs became a suitable indicator 
for overall economic growth and macroeconomic performance [Stiglitz (2002), Krugman (2009)].  
 
In theory, this apparent one-to-one correspondence is in line with standard neoclassical models, 
which conjecture that taxation and government spending have no impact on output growth 
[Cochrane (2009)]. Hence, if government programs funded by deficit spending are expected to 
exacerbate inflation and undermine macroeconomic stability and growth—particularly by 
crowding out private investments,—drastic cuts in government expenditures should increase 
efficiency in the allocation of resources and ultimately contribute to output expansion and growth, 
conversely.  
 
However, empirical evidences in advanced and developing countries alike have not always 
supported the theory underlying these neoclassical models. For instance, in a study based on the 
US economy, Fu et al. (2003) find the deficit to be an unreliable measure of growth and overall 
economic performance. Similarly, an empirical study investigating the link between fiscal policy 
and growth in a cross-section analysis involving a large number of developing countries fails to 
reach conclusive recommendations on the direction and stability of the association between fiscal 
adjustment and economic growth [Easterly and Rebelo (1993)].  
 
In fact, fiscal deficits can be either expansionary or contractionary, depending on the nature of 
programs financed under the government budget. An increase in budget deficits financed by tax 
cuts may be expansionary if it results in increases physical capital accumulation. Hence, 
governments in advanced, and more recently in emerging market economies, have consistently 
used the budget as an automatic stabilizer—running large fiscal deficits (spending increases and/or 
tax cuts) as counter-cyclical policy measures to avert downturns and continuously expand output 
and demands [Chang (2008), Stiglitz (2010)].7 
 
In this regard, the proliferation of large fiscal stimulus packages in the aftermath of the 2008 
global economic and financial crisis is in line with this counter-cyclical approach to policymaking 
[Spilimbergo et al. (2008), IMF (2009a)].8 Interestingly enough, the increase in government deficit 
to boost demands and mitigate the risks of economic downturns and enhance growth in these 
countries has also been accompanied by a monetary policy of extreme laxity—speedy recourse to 
quantitative easing and downward adjustments of interest rates which have fallen to historically 
low levels [Blanchard et al. (2010)].  
 
These latest developments and steps taken by advanced economies in response to the global 
downturn provide an opportunity to revisit the fiscal adjustment and growth nexus in Sub-Saharan 
Africa to inform future policy-making in the region. The speed and scale of the response, reflected 
                                                      
7 China announced a stimulus worth US$586 billion (1.2% of GDP) to boost domestic demand later in 2008.    
8 Making the case for fiscal stimulus in response to the global economic downturn, the IMF established a number 
of criteria for a successful recovery. In particular, it is stressed that the optimum fiscal package should be timely, 
large, lasting, diversified, contingent, collective and sustainable. For further details, see Spilimbergo et al. (2008).     4
in the size of stimulus packages in these economies, also suggest that the systematic 
implementation of pro-cyclical fiscal policies in Sub-Saharan Africa, including during episodes of 
economic downturns, is at odds with policy-making at the global level.  
 
It is therefore not surprising that these policies have resulted in significant economic and social 
costs, with dramatic long-term consequences, not least the marginalization of Sub-Saharan Africa 
in the new globalization landscape [Fofack (2009)]. Attempting to quantify these costs, this paper 
counterfactually estimates aggregate output in countries which undergone fiscal adjustments over 
the structural adjustment era under the assumption of slightly higher rates of deficit spending 
using transfer function models. Hypothetically departing from a systematic preference for pro-
cyclical expenditure switching policies, the model assumes higher deficit targets, attributed either 
to tax cuts or increases government spending.  
 
The results highlight a significant output expansion and growth as illustrated by the widening gap 
between actual and predicted aggregate output from transfer functions in the majority of 
countries. In particular, if instead of pro-cyclical expenditure switching and reducing policies, Sub-
Saharan African countries had opted for counter-cyclical policies the average per capita income in 
the region would be significantly higher, over fivefold above the current average, ceteris paribus. 
Interestingly enough, the remarkable increase in per capita income under this hypothetical 
alternative is consistent in both low—and medium-income countries alike.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section focuses on the dynamics of 
fiscal adjustments and growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. In particular, it uses nonparametric 
techniques to assess the interaction between fiscal deficits and growth over the adjustment era. 
Section III discusses the empirical specification of transfer function models that are used to 
counterfactually estimate the potential growth and welfare benefits of counter-cyclical fiscal 
policies in these countries. Section IV discusses the empirical results under the hypothetical 
alternative fiscal expansion, and infer on the implications of such policies for future growth and 
development strategies in the region. The last Section concludes. 
 
 
II.  Dynamics of Fiscal Adjustment and Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Beneath the proliferation of fiscal adjustments is the quest for macroeconomic stability often 
viewed as a prerequisite for economic growth [Easterly et al. (1994), World Bank (2005)]. In order 
to further these development goals, abstraction is often made of the potential benefits of inter-
temporal macroeconomic dynamics—whereby deficit-financed high-yield public investments 
could serve as catalyst for long-run growth and domestic revenues mobilization— to implement 
across-the-board expenditure cuts in government outlays [Agénor et al. (2003)].  
 
This emphasis on fiscal performance in the short run is probably motivated by the belief that 
recurrent public deficits are a serious impediment to growth, irrespective of their source and 
composition. However, the implied causal link between fiscal imbalances and economic growth 
hypothesized at the analytical level and underpinning neo-classical models needs not be automatic. 
In order to assess the nature of that relationship this section undertakes an empirical analysis of 
the dynamic interaction between fiscal performances and growth during the adjustment era, 
spanning 1980—2007.    5
One possible way to assess the nature of that relationship is to trace the path of growth and fiscal 
deficits over the period of program implementation using causality and correlation analysis. 
However, deriving point estimates from these measures of association requires a choice and 
specification of underlying variables, a priori. While rates of economic growth can be easily 
estimated and standardized for cross-country comparisons, the choice of point estimates for fiscal 
balances that allow comparisons across countries is less obvious, owing in part to the multiplicity 
of definitions available in the literature. It is also due to the challenges of constructing consistent 
data on government budget deficits across countries—the coexistence of cash and accrual 
budgeting in numerous countries in the region being a non negligible source of discrepancy 
[Hagemann (1999)].  
 
Notwithstanding these challenges, a number of definitions have emerged and are commonly used 
to assess countries’ fiscal stance. These measures include the conventional deficit, the primary 
deficit, the operational deficit and the structural budget deficit [Tanzi et al. (1993), Agénor (2000)]. 
Early choices and preferences in the literature have focused on the primary and conventional 
deficit. However, these two indicators are crude measures of fiscal deficits that do not take into 
account public debt and inflationary pressures.  
 
In practice, macroeconomic instability and external debt greatly affect the size of government 
fiscal balance, and may have implications for estimating either of these two measures. 
Furthermore, the conventional fiscal deficit is very sensitive to inflation, and may overestimate the 
size of the deficit during episodes of excess inflationary pressures. In particular, and to the extent 
that inflation affects the conventional deficit through interest payments on public debt, the degree 
of sensitivity of conventional deficits to inflation tends to be particularly important when public 
debt is high [Tanzi et al.(1993)].9  
 
In this regard and given that containing the rising stock of public debt and deficits are at the core 
of macroeconomic stabilization, the conventional fiscal balance may not necessarily be 
commensurate with the sustainability of fiscal stance in the region. At the same time, the primary 
fiscal balance does not adequately reflect the financing implications of a policy stance. This 
measure largely focuses on discretionary government spending and does not account for the 
burden of interest payments in countries running large public debt. As a result, it is often referred 
to as the noninterest deficit, and hence, may not adequately capture the fiscal stance of most 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, either.  
 
A large number of these countries accumulated sizable amounts of domestic and foreign debt 
during the adjustment eras. And in most cases, external liabilities reached unsustainable levels in 
the 1990s when a significant share of the budget was allocated to interest payments [Elbadawi et 
al.(1997)]. Although the net present value of these liabilities has since been discounted, particularly 
in the set of countries which received debt relief under the HIPC Initiative, interest payments on 
external debt remain an important component in the government budget in most countries.10 And 
failing to account for these liabilities can significantly underestimate fiscal deficits.  
 
                                                      
9 Empirically, Tanzi, Blejer and Teijeiro (1993) have shown that inflation can have a significant effect on the 
conventional deficit, especially when the domestic public debt, and correlatively interest rate bill, is high.  
10 Furthermore, a review of post-HIPC Completion Point countries has revealed a renewed deterioration of 
external debt thresholds in a number of countries [World Bank (2006)].     6
In this context, the operational balance has emerged as an alternative measure to the conventional 
and primary deficit. This alternative measure of fiscal deficit is calculated by netting out the 
inflationary component in nominal interest payments from the conventional balance, defined in 
real terms [Agénor (2000)]. Alternatively, it is also defined as the primary deficit plus the real 
component of interest payments, to take into account the cost of public debt (interest payments 
and inflation-induced higher costs of debt services) on government expenditures.  
 
Still, the operational balance does not account for the potentially negative effects of excess 
inflationary pressures on government’s revenues, especially in the presence of collection lags.11 
Nonetheless, this measure represents a significant improvement over the primary and 
conventional balance. Additionally, it is easy to calculate as it does not require special forecasts 
[Blanchard (1990)]. In fact, this measure is derived by adding the costs of government’s liabilities 
discounted for time preference and opportunity costs to the primary deficit. This improved 
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Where  t d  is the real primary deficit at time t;  t b  and 
*
t b are the stock of government domestic 
and external debt at time t, respectively;  t r and 
*
t r  denote real interest rates on domestic and 
foreign-currency denominated stock of national and external debt;  t E is the nominal exchange rate 
at time tand  t  is the going rate of inflation. 
 
In spite of these advantages, the operational balance is more suitable for assessing short-run fiscal 
performances. The medium-term fiscal policy stance is best estimated by the structural budget 
deficit [Blejer and Chu (1988)].12 Changes in the budget balances reflect both business cycle and 
structural factors such as discretionary policies. While changes in fiscal stance attributed to 
business cycles, such as reduction of revenue during downturns may be self-correcting, changes 
driven by structural factors can only be offset through discretionary measures; hence the need to 
differentiate between short—and medium-term fiscal balance.13 In this regard, removing the self-
correcting cyclical component from the budget balance may provide a more accurate medium-
term fiscal position—the structural budget deficit. 
 
In practice, structural deficits are derived by removing the cyclical component of government 
revenues and expenditures from the primary deficit. Assuming that the costs of servicing interest 
payments on domestic and external liabilities are accounted for automatically through inflation and 
                                                      
11 This effect has come to be known as the Olivera-Tanzi effect. The reduction of government revenues in real 
terms as a result of collection lags tends to be costly when inflation is high. According to these authors, real 
revenue collection could drop by over 9% if the collection lag is one month and average monthly inflation is 
10%. For the same inflation rate, revenue collection could drop by over 17% if the lag is two months.  
12 The fiscal impulse, which is related to the full employment deficit, measures the effects of fiscal policy in total 
aggregate demand [Heller et al. (1986)]. 
13 In practice, structural deficits have also been defined in opposition to cyclical deficits—the gap attributed to 
downturns, that automatically disappears when the economy recovers.   7
interest rate adjustments, the structural deficit can be expressed in terms of the operational budget 
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In theory, the cyclical component of the budget deficit is derived from the output gap attributed 
to business cycle:  GAP GAP d R G t c     , . The output GAP is derived by taking the difference 
between actual and potential (or capacity) output expressed in proportion of potential 
output 
* *) ( Y Y Y GAP   , where Y is the actual output and 
* Y is the potential output [Blejer 
and Chu (1988)]. Elasticities  G  and  R  denote the cyclical response of expenditure and revenue 
ratios to a one-percentage point increase in the cyclical output gap.  
 
In practice, it is difficult to estimate the potential output in Sub-Saharan Africa, where most 
countries operate far below capacity utilization, with extremely high unemployment rates. 
Moreover, potential output estimates are generally based on production function models, which 
require specifying output in terms of underlying factor inputs and total factor productivity. In 
order to circumvent the daunting task of estimating production functions in a context of largely 
underutilized capacities, we derive measures of structural deficit using a nonparametric method. In 
practice, the cyclical component of the primary deficit is purged by smoothing the data by means 
of Hodrick-Prescott filter.   
 
In what follows we use estimates of operational balances and structural balances to assess the 
nature and stability of the relationship between fiscal performances and growth across Sub-
Saharan African countries. From equation (1), the estimation of operational balance is based on 
the standard methodology. Effects of collection lags on government revenues and public deficits 
are not taken into account in part because collection lags in domestic resource mobilization 
primarily concern corporate taxes. Furthermore and in addition to consistency problems 
associated with reporting on collection time, government data on revenues and expenditures are 
not sufficiently disaggregated to allow a fair comparison across countries. 
 
The empirical analysis and estimation are based on a sample of 14 countries selected across Sub-
Saharan Africa on the basis of data quality.14 Operational and structural budget deficit are 
calculated for each country, and the results are expressed as a percentage of GDP to allow cross-
country comparisons. Real GDP per capita, public and private investment variables are taken from 
the World Bank World Development Indicator database. The data on public finance are taken 
from Government Financial Statistics (GFS) and World Economic Outlook (WEO). 
 
Table 1 provides the results averaged over the period 1980-2007 (a long-term trend of the fiscal 
adjustment and growth nexus is also assessed from Figure 1 below). Columns 1 and 2 provide 
estimates of operational and structural balances averaged over the sample period for each country. 
The following columns (3 and 5) provide a nonparametric measure of correlation assessing the 
                                                      
14 This set of sampled countries include: Benin, Botswana, Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Cameroon, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda and Senegal.    8
nature and direction of the association between fiscal performances and economic growth for 
each country. The corresponding p-values of these statistics immediately follow (columns 4 and 6).  
 
 






























Benin ‐2.642% ‐2.669% 0.473 0.005 0.598 0.000
Botswana 6.145% 6.231% ‐0.030 0.439 0.043 0.414
Central African Rep. ‐2.586% ‐2.526% 0.307 0.056 0.308 0.055
Cote d'Ivoire ‐5.325% ‐5.228% 0.359 0.030 0.347 0.035
Cameroon ‐0.794% ‐0.875% 0.325 0.046 0.432 0.011
Ethopia ‐4.697% ‐4.683% 0.141 0.237 0.265 0.086
Gabon 0.363% 0.574% 0.037 0.427 ‐0.018 0.464
Gambia ‐5.296% ‐5.277% 0.123 0.266 0.085 0.334
Ghana ‐5.565% ‐5.351% ‐0.006 0.487 ‐0.104 0.299
Kenya ‐3.527% ‐3.518% 0.486 0.004 0.307 0.056
Mozambique ‐5.341% ‐5.194% 0.594 0.000 0.656 0.000
Nigeria ‐1.960% ‐1.816% 0.159 0.209 0.244 0.105
Rwanda ‐3.850% ‐3.875% 0.501 0.003 0.457 0.007
Senegal ‐2.406% ‐2.381% ‐0.012 0.476 ‐0.044 0.411
Note: The cyclical component of primary balance used in calculating structural balance is obtained using HP filter.  
 
Except Botswana and Gabon which enjoy fiscal surpluses (in excess of 6 percent of GDP in the 
former), other countries run sustained fiscal deficits. This is most notably reflected in the negative 
sign associated with the two estimates (structural and operational balances). In particular, Ghana, 
Côte d’Ivoire and Mozambique recorded the largest deficits over the period, in excess of 5 percent 
of GDP. However, these high-fiscal deficit countries in the region pale in comparison to a recent 
deterioration of fiscal stance in most advanced economies where fiscal deficits are in double digits, 
and projected to increase even more in the coming years [IMF (2009b), OECD (2009)].   
 
Also worth pointing out, however, is the consistency between operational and structural balances 
across countries. In addition to signed consistency, the two estimates are also of the same order of 
magnitude. The relatively small absolute deviation between the operational and structural balances 
across countries suggests that the fiscal stance is less affected by business cycles in the majority of 
Sub-Saharan African economies. Gupta et al. (2005) attribute this disproportionately weak effect 
of business cycles on fiscal performance in low-income countries to the absence of automatic 
stabilizers.  
   9







   10
The level and signed consistency of these two measures of fiscal deficits is equally reflected in the 
correlation between fiscal performance and economic growth across the sample. For all but three 
countries (Botswana, Gambia and Senegal), the correlation between income growth and fiscal 
balance is positive, both when fiscal performance is measured by operational and structural 
balances. However, the correlation coefficient associated with these positively correlated variables 
is not systematically significant. Despite this lack of significance, the positive association between 
operational balance and growth in a number of countries may suggest that a strong fiscal stance is 
growth-enhancing. 
 
However, correlation does not necessarily imply causation. In fact, the positive association derived 
from point estimates is not consistent over the entire support of the distribution. An assessment 
of the relationship over the entire support of the distribution produces a more ambiguous result. 
In effect, a long-term trend of operational balance and growth suggests that sharp deteriorations 
of fiscal balances are likewise associated with higher and lower rates of economic growth. This 
ambiguous result is illustrated by Figure 1, which depicts operational balances and economic 
growth rates in Nigeria and Senegal. This outcome suggests that the relationship between fiscal 
adjustment and growth in the region warrants a further investigation.15 
 
 
III. Analytical  Framework 
 
A review of empirical research that models the effects of fiscal adjustments on growth suggests 
that fiscal austerity affects economic growth through a nonlinear pattern [Giavazzi, Jappelli and 
Pagano (2000)]. The inherent nonlinearity reflects varying and event divergent responses to fiscal 
adjustment by economic agents. Analytically, the alternative linearity hypothesis would require a 
uniform distribution of expected benefits of growth across the different economic agents 
following a fiscal impulse, irrespective of the determinants of growth and consumer behaviors.  
 
In practice, there are a host of growth determinants which affect output in different ways. 
Although private and public investments are often singled out as key determinants of growth, 
there are other factors which may just as well play a significant role in the accumulation process. 
Most notable among these factors are human capital formation, research and development, 
openness and a set of initial conditions [Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996), Pattillo et al. (2005)]. While 
the transmission channels of fiscal adjustments may use indirect paths, the welfare effects of fiscal 
adjustments are more direct, especially when the reduction of deficits entail expenditure switching, 
and particularly cuts in public expenditures and wages [World Bank (2003), Sachs and Warner 
(1995), Gupta et al. (2005)]. 
 
Analytically the resilience effects associated with initial conditions, which are critical for long-run 
growth and output expansion, are illustrated by the nature and quality of physical infrastructures 
and level of economic development. At the same time, the growth effects of fiscal adjustments 
differ significantly over time. Fiscal adjustments that may first appear contractionary may become 
expansionary in the medium to long term. This can happen as a result of delayed response to the 
implementation of expansionary fiscal policies or out of concerns regarding the financing of 
inherent growing deficits.  
                                                      
15 Further information on trend of operational balance and growth is provided in Annex Table 1 for other 
countries.   11
 
In order to account for the dynamics and nonlinear path of that relationship, this paper adopts the 
framework of modeling the growth and fiscal adjustments nexus using transfer functions.16 As an 
alternative to structural models, transfer functions combine regression and time series analysis, and 
are particularly suitable for modeling nonlinear functional relationships [Chiogna et al. (2008)]. In 
particular, they allow the inclusion of lagged response and lagged explanatory variables, and other 
contemporaneous variables in the specification of the response.  
 
This flexibility can help integrate the dynamics of growth during fiscal adjustments in a model that 
goes beyond the restriction to a single input, counterfactually assessing the growth effects under 
an alternative expansionary fiscal policy.17 In their reduced form, these models can be represented 
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where the variable  t Y is the real GDP per capita income at timet. Throughout the paper, the real 
GDP per capital is the response variable.18 The second component of the right-hand side 
) ) ( ) ( (
1
t B B   
  provides the time series representation of the combined model.    ) (B  and 
) (B  are lagged polynomials, and  t  is a normally distributed error term which has a small 
variance [Chiogna et al. (2008)].19 The first component of this transfer function provides the 
structural representation ( t i
k
i
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In order to account for the multiplicity of growth determinants, the initial set of variables 
considered for inclusion in the structural component of the model are government 
revenues ) (
g
t R , aggregated government expenditures ) (
x
t G , private capital  ) ( t K and labor 
supply ) ( t L .20 This specification is consistent with the model developed by Kneller et al. (1999). 
However, variables in the proposed framework also include lagged response as well as lagged and 
contemporaneous explanatory variables to account for the initial conditions and resilience effects. 
Hence, an expanded form of (3), taking into account that dual formulation can be represented by 
equation (4) as follows: 
 
                                                      
16 Transfer functions are also known as multivariate autoregressive-moving average models (MARMA).  
17 Transfer functions are very popular in the field of engineering where they are used to estimate the magnitude 
of impulse responses. These models relate specific inputs and outputs, and their application has been extended to 
economics in settings. For further details, see Box, Jenkins and Reinsel (1994). 
18 Estimating the effects of fiscal adjustments on growth in the USA, Fu et al. (2001) use unemployment rates 
which are sensitive to the business cycle as the response variable. However, most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
do not have accurate time series data on unemployment rates.  
19 The smaller variance is embedded in the modeling specification, which produces relatively stable parameter 
estimates (see Pindyck and Rubinfeld for further details). 
20 Real GDP per capita, public and private investment as well as human development variables are taken from 
the World Bank World Development Indicator data base, the data on public finance is taken from Government 
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The main objective of the study is to counterfactually quantify the potential growth effects of 
fiscal adjustments during the era of economic reforms and structural adjustments. In theory, when 






t l G R   . Hence, the 
inclusion of net lending 
n
t l  assumes that deficits are mainly financed by the accumulation of 
domestic and foreign liabilities. In other words, a change in revenues or spending has to be 
matched by offsetting changes elsewhere.  
 
Although the lending variable in the model accounts for domestic and external financing of the 
deficit, financing gaps are largely covered by foreign aid in the majority of countries; and external 
debt thresholds are derived from predefined deficit targets, which are paramount in the design of 
macroeconomic frameworks. The low inflation target imbedded in most macroeconomic 
frameworks made it very difficult for countries to contemplate the option to inflate their way to 
growth and prosperity, particularly by drawing on higher inflation to bridge financing gaps. 
 
In theory, the model should be calibrated to fully operate in a deficit mode, where the dynamic of 
responses is assessed for incremental shocks of magnitude:  ) 0 (    c . However, in order to 
avoid perfect collinearity, the budget balance is not included in the empirical specification in the 
estimation phase. Nevertheless, the transfer function specified by equation (5) below is 
represented in terms of expenditures and deficit financing to focus on the expenditure side of the 
budget. In this “expenditure-adjusting mode” an incremental shock in the amount ctranslates into 
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The emphasis on the expenditure side in the specification provided by equation (5) is warranted, 
particularly in light of the prominence of expenditures switching policies in stabilization programs 
and the structurally narrow tax base faced by most countries in the region [Rodrik (2006), 
Bayraktar and Fofack (2007), Gupta (2007)].21 The narrow tax base reduces the space for fiscal 
adjustment through the revenue side of the budget, hence the emphasis on expenditures switching 
policies. Still, welfare and growth outcomes from the hypothesized expansionary fiscal policy also 
depend on the nature and composition of government expenditures and private sector’s response 
[Alesina and Ardagna (1998), Gupta et al. (2005)].  
 
In order to account for this composition effect, a distinction is made between public investment 
and public consumption (recurrent expenditures) in the specification of the empirical model. In 
particular, the initial variable 
x
t G (aggregate government expenditures) is disaggregated into sub-
                                                      
21 Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel attribute the narrow tax base in Sub-Saharan Africa to the lack of economic 
diversification and low-productivity growth primary sector. Empirically Ghura (1998) shows that the 
performance of government revenue is inversely proportional to the share of agriculture in GDP; it is also 
negatively affected by the degree of corruption in the country.   13
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Following this decomposition, the resulting transfer function is represented by equation (6) below: 
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Under this latest representation, a number of growth effects of deficit-increasing scenarios can be 
investigated. Of particular interest is the contrast between the growth effects of rising deficits 
when increases in government outlays are primarily allocated to final government consumption 
versus the alternative priority allocation to capital expenditures. In both cases the hypothesized 
incremental deficit can be financed by increases in government borrowings.   
 
Conversely, the growth-fiscal adjustment nexus can also be represented in terms of government 
revenues using a slightly modified version of the transfer function under the “revenue-adjusting 
mode”. Under this latter specification, an increase in government fiscal deficits as a result of 
reduction of corporate tax and/or reduction of revenues from public enterprises (possibly in a 
context of economic downturn) is directly proportional to increase private physical capital 
accumulation. Under this alternative, the growth function takes a slightly different specification 
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In line with the expenditure-induced fiscal deficit transfer function, a number of different 
scenarios assessing the growth effects of an expansionary fiscal policy under a net reduction of 
government revenues can likewise be evaluated from (7). Of particular interest is the effect of 
deficit increases on growth when private savings from corporate or income taxes reduction or 
across-the-board tax cuts are used to expand private physical capital accumulation. Assuming that 
lost government revenues are similarly financed through further increases in public debt, this 
scenario is tested against the alternative scenario of fiscal contraction—corporate tax hikes to 
finance rising fiscal deficits and cuts in public spending.  
 
 
IV.  Estimation and Empirical Results 
 
This section focuses on the estimation of the parameters   q p k     , ,   ; , ,   ; , , 1 1 0       
underlying the different transfer functions and models discussed in the previous sections. The 
technique for estimating these parameters is ARIMA, reflecting the dual representation of the 
model, which combines both regression and time series analysis. The latter component is 
accounted for by including the autoregressive and moving average vectors in the transfer function   14
to partially capture the nonlinearity in the distribution of aggregate output in response to fiscal 
adjustments and implementation of discretionary policies.  
 
In light of the small absolute deviation between structural and operational balances, the estimation 
of these parameters is based on the latter measure of fiscal deficits, either in the revenue or 
expenditure-adjusting mode.22 Furthermore and regardless of the model and scenarios, the 
parameters in the structural regression equations and the parameters in the time series 
representation are estimated simultaneously. In turn these estimated parameters are used to infer 
on prospects for growth under the hypothetical alternative counter-cyclical policy options. 
 
However, before proceeding with parameters estimation and inference, it is important to first 
examine the partial and total correlation functions for the response and independent variables in 
order to specify the optimum lag level for the polynomials  ) (    and    ) ( B B   . This empirical 
analysis suggests an optimum lag level of one, as reflected in the inclusion of an AR(1) vector auto 
regressive and moving average of first order (MA(1)) in the sets of dependent variables in each 
model. Hence and on the basis of this specification, the models are estimated in levels in order to 
account for both short—and medium-term effects of fiscal adjustment on growth. 
 
Following this specification of lag levels for the polynomials, the parameters are estimated. Tables 2-5 
in Annexes summarize the results presented in the form of four tables, corresponding to the different 
empirical models. Henceforth, these models are referred to as Model (A), Model (B), Model (C) and 
Model (D). While the results in Table 2 (Model (A)) are derived under the revenue-adjusting mode, the 
ones in Table 3 (Model (B)) are derived from the expenditure-adjusting mode. Empirical results in 
Table 4 (Model (C)) accounts for the composition of public spending. In particular, the decomposition 
of government expenditures into recurrent and capital expenditures allows one to contrast the extent 
to which the nature and composition of public spending may affect the dynamic of fiscal adjustment 
and growth. Table 5 (Model (D) shows the results from the revenue-adjusting mode. 
 
These models use real GDP per capita as the response variable.23 However, right-hand side variables 
vary slightly, depending on the models. Alternatively, government expenditure is used in the 
expenditure-adjusting mode, and government revenue is included in the revenue-adjusting mode. The 
transition from the expenditure-adjusting mode to the revenue-adjusting is operated through net 
lending. Once again, this transition assumes that expenditures always balance revenues when the 
budget constraint is fully specified. Other key variables are labor force, the moving average, 
autoregressive vector and private investment. Since reliable data on capital stock is not available, 
private investment is used as a proxy in the empirical specification.     
 
Note that under the proposed specifications (Model (A) through Model (D)), and for all but two 
countries (The Gambia and Kenya), the adjusted R-Squared is relatively large, over 90 percent for most 
countries. In particular, Botswana consistently has an adjusted R-Squared that exceeds 99 percent. The 
relatively large value of this coefficient of determination suggests an overall goodness-of-fit. Indeed, on 
the basis of this estimate over 90 percent of the proportional variance in aggregate output is fully 
accounted for by the underlying transfer functions and empirical models.  
 
                                                      
22 Naturally, this choice assumes that the potential effects of the business cycle on fiscal performance are limited 
in the majority of countries. 
23 A specification that uses growth rates as a response was also considered during the estimation. The results 
were not markedly different, although, the model appears more robust when real GDP per capita is the response.   15
The overall goodness-of-fit of these empirical models is also reflected in the relative stability of the 
parameters. The regression coefficients have a consistent sign in most countries. For Model (A), 
private investment is growth-enhancing in most countries. In all but one country, the coefficient 
associated with this variable has a positive sign. And in a number of cases, it is significant at the 1 and 
5 percent level. Likewise, government revenues are positively related to growth, and the coefficient 
associated with that variable is significant at the 1 percent level in a number of cases. This is illustrated 
by the relatively large value of the t-statistics (in parenthesis right below the estimated parameters).  
 
On the other hand, net lending either has a negative sign or is not significant at all. And whenever it is 
significant, it has a negative sign, suggesting that on average the accumulation of liabilities (domestic 
and external liabilities) by the public sector has not necessarily been growth-enhancing in the region. 
However, the apparent negative effect of public debt on growth—particularly through the 
prohibitively high cost of debt servicing on public investment—may simply reflect the fact that the use 
of these borrowed resources might not have systematically followed the “golden rule” of investing 
primarily in productive assets with potentially high yields. Otherwise, the overwhelming majority of 
countries would not have faced debt overhang in the run up to the HIPC debt relief in the 1990s.24 
 
Similarly, the significance of the time series component in the transfer functions across the four 
models is worth pointing out. In spite of the relatively low level of lags for the polynomials—the 
models with the largest explanatory power have only one lagged dependent variable terms 
  t t t y L       1  and one lagged moving average terms     t t t L y       1 —the 
autoregressive vector is significant at the 1-percent level in several countries. The significance of these 
time series components suggests that combining first-order serially correlated errors with standard 
regression analysis produces a better forecast of aggregate output.25 
 
In particular, in several countries, the autoregressive vector is strongly significant as reflected in the 
extremely large value of the corresponding t-statistics. Furthermore, the estimated parameter has a 
positive sign whenever it is significant, suggesting that initial conditions, and especially level of capital 
stock greatly matters for output expansion. In other words, attaining a certain minimum threshold for 
capital stock might emerge as a pre-requisite for entering virtuous circle of sustained output expansion 
and per capita income growth. Likewise, the first order moving average component also suggests that 
only immediately previous white noise errors affect aggregate output. In most countries, the parameter 
associated with the first order moving average vector has a positive sign and is significant at the 1-
percent level as well, although it is less so in Model C (Table 4 in Annex).   
 
In light of the overall goodness-of-fit of these models, the proposed transfer functions are used to 
infer on the potential growth and welfare benefits of alternative counter-cyclical fiscal policies. In 
particular, a set of policy experiments are undertaken to hypothetically assess the growth effect of 
counter-cyclical policy responses in the region. Instead of systematically carrying out across-the-board 
cuts in government outlays, these experiments hypothetically assume that countries opted for fiscal 
expansion in line with policies recently implemented by a large number of advanced economies in 
response to the subprime crisis and later to mitigate second-round effects which came with the 
globalization of the downturn.  
                                                      
24 In fact, the most successful emerging market economies of Asia drew on external financing to cover the saving 
gap in the early stages of their development. However, unlike Sub-Saharan Africa, which rely heavily on official 
development aid, FDI played a greater role in that region [World Bank (2005), Rajan and Subramanian (2008)]. 
25 In fact, a restricted model without the time series component produces a significantly lower adjusted R-Square, 
and therefore may poorly forecast aggregate output growth.   16
 
Invariably, these experiments assume higher fiscal deficits, either as a result of increased government 
expenditures or reduced fiscal revenues (i.e. lower tax collection). Alternatively, widening government 
deficits as a result of fiscal expansion is reflected either in increased private capital accumulation, public 
investments or recurrent expenditures. The potential benefits of increased public investments under 
this hypothetical fiscal expansion are compared with the alternative increase in public consumption. 
However, simulations also consider the hypothetical option of fiscal expansion based on reallocation 
of savings from reduced net lending—a scenario that may be consistent with debt relief under the 
enhanced HIPC initiative.   
 
These hypothetical scenarios are then contrasted with actual outcome. Note that the decades of fiscal 
adjustments were characterized by a protracted economic recession and sustained decline in real per 
capita income in the region [Artadi and Sala-i-Martin (2003), World Bank (2005)].26 Graphically, this 
poor economic performance throughout the period of program implementation is reflected in the 
trend of real per capita income (actual distribution) and widening income gaps with the predicted 
output growth derived from transfer functions under the alternative. The case of Cameroon is 
investigated as an illustrative example in Figures 2—4. 
 
The widening income gap between actual and predicted output is consistent across scenarios. Under 
the first simulation (model (A)), the transfer function has both government revenues and expenditures 
as independent variables. The predicted output from this representation is based on the hypothetical 
assumption of 5 percent uniform and consistent reduction in government revenues (i.e. lower taxes) 
throughout the reference period matched by a cut of the same order of magnitude in government 
expenditure with the proceeds fully reallocated to private capital accumulation. In this regard, it is a 
fiscally neutral scenario. The drop in revenue is entirely allocated to private capital accumulation in the 
form of savings from taxes. 
 
After estimating the predicted value of aggregate output under the hypothesized scenario, we then 
calculate the new growth rates using this predicted series. In turn, we apply these growth rates to 
recalculate the predicted income measured in per capita GDP terms, assuming that predicted and 
actual output are exactly equal at the origin. The results are depicted by Figure 2 below (panel A). This 
figure shows a marked deviation between actual and predicted output in constant 2000 US dollars. In 
effect, under this hypothetical scenario, the income gap increased more than fivefold, with Cameroon’s 
predicted per capita income attaining levels enjoyed by emerging market economies. 
 
Notwithstanding the trend consistency of aggregate output under this alternative, the overall impact of 
expenditure reallocation on output growth is slightly lower when transfers from expenditure cuts are 
not accompanied by a similar reduction in government revenues in the form of tax cuts. In fact, when 
the rise in private investment exclusively emanates from a reduction in public spending at a constant 
rate of 5 percent, the predicted output gap is much lower than the alternative hypothesis which 





                                                      
26 There is a growing consensus on the poor performance of economic reforms and adjustment programs in Sub-
Saharan Africa. A World Bank study assessing the impact of these programs concluded on the following note 
“Despite good policy reforms, debt relief, continued high levels of official assistance, promising developments in 
governance, and relatively supportive external climate, no take-off has ensued”[World Bank (2005)].   17
Figure 2 - Cameroon: Different Scenarios on Budget Allocation 
 
 
   18
The second set of experiments follow the same logic of reallocation and changes in the composition of 
government expenditures. Likewise, one of these experiments assumes a 5 percent uniform reduction 
in net lending and therefore reduced interest payments on government liabilities in the same order of 
magnitude. These savings are either redeployed to fund public expenditures or indirectly support 
private investments through lost tax revenues. This experiment considers the two alternatives: the 
option of raising public expenditure from reduced debt burden is contrasted with the alternative of 
boosting private investments in the same order of magnitude and corresponding cut in the stock of 
government debt (Figure 3 below).  
 



























































































































Under these two alternative scenarios, the hypothesized predicted output is still significantly higher 
than the actual, further supporting the expected benefits of fiscal expansion during economic 
downturns, interestingly in a region where pro-cyclical fiscal adjustments have been at the heart of 
macroeconomic reforms [World Bank (2005), Rodrik (2006)].27 The potential benefits under this 
hypothesized alternative are further illustrated by the sustained decline in Cameroon’s actual output 
during most of the adjustment era, especially between 1985 and 1996 [World Bank (2003)].28 As Figure 
                                                      
27 In most countries, the protracted economic downturn is reflected in the recurrence of large and sustained 
balance of payment deficits and negative terms of trade shocks. In some cases, and particularly in natural 
resources dependent countries, these deficits were both the manifestation and cause of the crisis. 
28 According to the World Bank, Cameroon went through a long period of economic depression from the mid-
1980s through the mid-1990s. During that window of major economic contraction, it experienced serious 
economic difficulties, with per capita income falling by over 50 percent and fiscal deficits rising rapidly. In 
response, the government undertook large cut in nominal wages, drastic cuts in social and infrastructure 
spending. It also accumulated large external and domestic arrears [World Bank (2003)].   19
3 illustrates, this sustained output decline only exacerbated the growing income gap between predicted 
and actual output in Cameroon. 
 
Notwithstanding the consistency in the trend of output growth under these two alternatives—
reallocation of savings from reduced net lending toward public investments versus private capital 
accumulation—the contrast further corroborates the much higher level of aggregate output under the 
latter option. In particular and consistent with existing empirical research, the predicted level of output 
under the hypothesized uniform increase private investment is significantly and consistently higher 
than the alternative option of allocating the savings from reduced interest payments exclusively 
towards raising public investments [Rajan and Subramanian (2008)]. 
 
The last scenario contrasts the expected growth and welfare benefits of raising public investments with 
the alternative of expanding recurrent expenditures. Likewise, this last scenario assumes a constant and 
uniform increase in both recurrent and capital expenditures in the same order of magnitude (5%). In 
essence, pro-cyclical fiscal policy under this option is either the result of deficit increases or 
alternatively a reduction of net lending possibly from debt relief. Likewise, the predicted aggregate 
output under both alternatives is consistently above actual (Figure 4). However, the expected benefits 
under the alternative increases capital expenditures are significantly higher than the option of raising 
public consumption. This result is consistent with other studies and further corroborates the extent to 
which the composition of public spending may affect growth in developing countries [Gupta et al. 
(2005)].      
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Interestingly, the overall benefits of fiscal expansion for growth and welfare improvement are 
consistent across the region, even in the set of countries which have a much lower level of income—
low and lower middle-income countries. For instance, in Mozambique where actual annual income per 
capita remains below the US$200 threshold over most of the adjustment era, the predicted level of 
aggregate output under the hypothesized alternative fiscal expansion is equally uniformly higher, with 
the gap between actual and predicted widening significantly in outer years as well (see Figures 1 and 2 
in Annex). 
 
Although hypothetical, the potential benefits of counter-cyclical policies are significant and highlight 
the scale of lost output and opportunities for welfare improvement during the adjustment era. 
Furthermore, the consistency in the simulations of predicted output across countries is also telling. In 
this regard, it is not at all surprising that the World Bank’s report on a retrospective assessment of 
lessons learned from decades of economic reforms made a not-so-veiled critic of the systematic 
implementation of fiscal adjustments during the decades of structural adjustment in developing 
countries [World Bank (2005)].  
 
As one of the key recommendations, the report stressed that “The goal of achieving macroeconomic 
stability does not imply a need to minimize fiscal deficits at all times.” Interestingly, the report went on 
even further to highlight the costs of fiscal adjustments for economic growth in an inter-temporal 
setting, essentially saying that a “lower fiscal deficit achieved today through off-budget contingent 
liabilities, or through cutting back public investments and thus reducing long-run growth and the 
future tax base, may mean a higher fiscal deficit in the future.”      
 
 
V.  Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
 
This paper revisits the sacrosanct policy of fiscal adjustments widely carried out across Sub-Saharan 
Africa during the era of adjustments and macroeconomic stabilization. The renewed interest in this 
topic is partly motivated by the latest recourse to automatic stabilizers, most notably reflected in the 
enactment of historically large fiscal stimulus packages by numerous industrialized and emerging 
market economies in response to the global downturn triggered by the US subprime crisis. As a result 
of these countercyclical policies, fiscal deficits are projected to reach new record levels in most 
industrialized nations in 2009 [IMF (2009b), OECD (2009)].29 
 
Although partly attributable to the conjunction of lost tax revenues in a downturn and exceptional 
increases in government expenditures, these deficit projections are extremely large, even by developing 
countries standards. They are well beyond anything ever faced by countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
even at the height of chronic balance of payments crises and negative terms of trade shocks, which 
partly prompted the recourse to fiscal adjustment and macroeconomic stabilization. Yet still, this 
exceptional rise in public deficits, and correlatively public debt, in a large number of advanced 
economies is certainly not too much of a price to pay in order to avert a protracted recession, which 
could have taken a U or W-shaped, or worst still turned into a depression [Krugman (2009)]. 
 
It is against this backdrop that this paper revisits the growth and fiscal adjustment nexus in Sub-
Saharan Africa. In particular, the paper assesses the dynamic of fiscal adjustment and growth in the 
                                                      
29 For instance, according to latest IMF figures, fiscal deficits expressed as a percentage of GDP are projected to 
exceed 12% and 11% in 2009 in the USA and UK, respectively. According OECD latest estimates, fiscal deficits 
are projected to reach historically large levels in other advanced economies.   21
region, and counterfactually estimates the potential costs and losses associated with a systematic 
implementation of fiscal austerity in the region. In practice, these costs have been characterized by 
sustained output contraction resulting in negative economic growth, falling per capita income in real 
terms and rising poverty rates. In light of these abysmal economic and social outcomes, development 
in Sub-Saharan Africa or the absence of it has been labeled as the economic tragedy of the 20th century 
[Artadi and Sala-i-Martin (2003)].  
 
In hindsight, this characterization is probably the high price that Sub-Saharan African countries might 
have paid to preserve macroeconomic stability. However, after an empirical analysis which highlights 
the ambiguous nature of the relationship between fiscal adjustment and growth in the region, this 
paper shows that such a price might indeed has been prohibitively too high to be borne by any 
country. Using transfer function models, counterfactual simulations over the adjustment era show that 
the costs in terms of aggregate output were indeed significant for most countries. In particular, the 
average per capita income in the region would have been significantly higher and the income gap with 
other regions of the world substantially smaller if instead of sustained fiscal contraction, countries had 
loosen the grip on fiscal discipline to expand investments and physical capital accumulation.  
 
More specifically, it is shown that an hypothetical deficit increase over the adjustment era would have 
resulted in aggregate output and per capita income growing by more than fivefold, especially if 
revenues from lower corporate taxes had been used to raise the level of physical capital in the private 
sector, ceteris paribus. At the same time, the benefits in terms of economic growth are also positive 
when excess deficits are incurred to finance public investments, although these hypothetical returns are 
much lower than the ones achieved from increased physical capital accumulation in the private sector. 
Interestingly enough, these results are consistent across all sampled countries in the region—lower and 
middle-income countries alike.  
 
These empirical results and ongoing implementation of countercyclical policies to avert a protracted 
economic recession and perhaps ward off depression in advanced economies, if anything, suggest that 
the quest for macroeconomic stability should no longer be an end objective in the region. In other 
words, fiscal adjustment should no longer be seen as a sacrosanct objective pursued invariably and at 
all costs, even at the expenses of economic growth and poverty reduction.30 Instead, fiscal policy 
should become an instrument to smooth out business cycles and achieve sustainable economic growth, 
especially in an environment where financial repression has resulted in persistent credit rationing and 
increasing fragmentation of the financial system [Tchundjang (1979), Steel et al. (1997)].     
 
Fortunately the scale of the current global economic and financial crisis and speed of international 
transmissions have called for coordinated responses at the global level. This has been reflected in the 
proliferation of timely sequenced fiscal stimuli in both developed and developing countries alike. 
Carried by this global wave of fiscal expansion, a number of Sub-Saharan African countries, 
particularly the ones with large fiscal space also designed and implemented fiscal stimuli to boost 
domestic demands and mitigate the spillover effects of the global downturn and ultimately enhance 
economic growth and avert a further deterioration of living standards. In this line, Mauritius enacted a 
fiscal stimulus package worth 3.4 percent of GDP in March 2009, which is relatively large even by 
                                                      
30 This point was recently echoed in one of the IMF’s highly discussed papers on “Rethinking Macroeconomic 
Policy” and may be viewed as one of the main lessons drawn from the 2008 global economic and financial crisis 
[Blanchard et al. (2010)].   22
international standards [World Bank (2009)]. A number of other countries in the region have also 
followed suit, including Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda [Kasekende et al. (2009)].31   
 
However, even as countries which in the past have excessively abided by pro-cyclical fiscal austerity 
entered the new policy paradigm of countercyclical fiscal expansion, steps should be taken to ensure 
that these stimuli do not lead to another cycle of debt overhang, which in the past dramatically 
curtailed the growth of public investments and capital accumulation in the region. In this regard, and 
to the extent that empirical results show that hypothetical returns of fiscal expansion in terms of 
aggregate output and income growth would be much lower if deficits are largely run to finance public 
consumption instead of investments, the design and implementation of these stimulus packages, and 
more generally the shift towards greater recourse to fiscal policy, should be guided by the productivity 





























                                                      
31 The South African government implemented a fiscal stimulus package worth Rands 787 billion (about US$100 
billion), largely to finance public investments and infrastructure projects. At the same time, the South African 
Reserve Bank eased monetary policy through cutting of its policy rate by cumulative 500 basis points. Similarly 
and in order to support the implementation of counter-cyclical policy measures, the governments of Tanzania 
and Uganda raised expenditures in the 2009-10 budget by 30 percent and 20 percent, respectively. The Federal 
Government of Nigeria also implemented a fiscal stimulus of 1.6 trillion Naira to enhance growth and avoid job 
losses. At the same time, many countries, which did not formally implement fiscal stimuli offered tax rebates to 
corporations in order to expand output growth in a context of global contraction. This is particularly the case for 
countries such as Cameroon, Mali, and the Democratic Republic of Congo [Kasekende et al. (2009)].   23
References: 
Agénor Pierre-Richard (2000). The Economics of Adjustment and Growth. Academic Press. 
Agénor Pierre-Richard, Alejandro Izquierdo and Hippolyte Fofack (2003). “The Integrated 
Macroeconomic Model for Poverty Analysis: A Quantitative Macroeconomic Framework for the 
Analysis of Poverty Reduction Strategies”. World Bank Policy research Working Paper No. 3092.  
Akyuz Yilmaz and Charles Gore (2001). “African Economic Development in a Comparative 
Perspective”, Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 25, 265-288. 
Alesina A. and S. Ardagna (1998). “Tales of Fiscal Adjustment”. Economic Policy: A European 
Forum, No. 7, 487-546. 
Ambler Steve and Alain Paquet (1996). “Fiscal Spending Shocks, Endogenous Growth, Spending and 
Real Business Cycles”, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 20. 
Artadi V. Elsa and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (2003). “The Economic Tragedy of the 20th century: Growth in 
Africa”, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 9865. 
Bayraktar Nihal and Hippolyte Fofack (2007). “Specification of Investment Function in Sub-Saharan 
Africa”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4171. 
Berg Andy and Zia Qureshi (2005). “The MDGs: Building a Momentum”, Finance and Development, 
The International Monetary Fund. Vol. 42, Number 3. 
Blanchard Olivier (1990). “Suggestions for a new set of fiscal indicators”. OECD Economics and 
Statistics Department, Working Papers No. 79. 
Blanchard Olivier, Giovanni Dell’Ariccia and Paolo Mauro (2010). “Rethinking Macroeconomic 
Policy”. IMF Staff Position Note, SPN/10/03.  
Blejer Mario and Ke-Young Chu (1988). “Measurement of Fiscal Impact: Methodological Issues. 
International Monetary Fund, Washington DC.  
Blejer Mario and Adrienne Cheasty (1991). “The Measurement of Fiscal Deficits: Analytical and 
Methodological Issues”, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXIX, pp. 1644-1678. 
Box, G. E. P., Jenkins, G. M., and Reinsel, G. C. (1994). Time Series Analysis: Forecasting and Control (3rd 
ed). New Jersey: Prentice Hall.  
Chang Ha-Joon (2008). “Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism”, 
Bloomsbury Press. 
Chiogna Monica, Carlo Gaetan and Guido Masarotto (2008). “Automatic Identification of Seasonal 
Transfer Function Models by Means of Iterative Stepwise and Genetic Algorithms.” Journal of Time 
Series Analysis, Vol. 29, Issue 1, pp. 37-50. 
Cochrane John H. (2009). “Fiscal theory, and fiscal and monetary policy in the financial crisis”, NBER 
Working Paper No. xxxx. National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Easterly William and Sergio Rebelo (1993). “Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth: An Empirical 
Investigation”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 32 (1993) 417-458. 
Easterly William and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (1993). “Fiscal Adjustment and Macroeconomic 
Performances in Developing Countries”. The World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 8, No. 2. The 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.   24
Easterly William, Rodriguez C. A. and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (1994). “Public Sector Deficits and 
Macroeconomic Performance”. The World Bank, Washington DC. 
Easterly William (2007). “How the Millennium Development Goals Are Unfair to Africa.” Brookings 
Institution Working Paper No. 14. 
Elbadawi Ibrahim, Benno Ndulu and Njuguna Ndung’u (1997). “Debt Overhang and Economic 
Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa”, in External Finance for Low-Income Countries, ed. By Zubair Iqbal 
and Ravi Kanbur, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC. 
Fofack Hippolyte (2008). “Technology and Poverty Trap in Sub-Saharan Africa”. World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 4582. The World Bank Group. 
Fofack Hippolyte (2009). “Determinants of Globalization and Growth Prospects for Sub-Saharan 
African Countries”. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5019. The World Bank Group. 
Fu Dong, Lori L. Taylor and Mine K. Yucel (2003). “Fiscal Policy and Growth”, Federal Reserve Bank 
of Dallas, Research Department Working Paper 0301. 
Ghura Dhaneshwar (1998). “Tax Revenue in Sub-Saharan Africa: Effects of Economic Policies and 
Corruption,” IMF Working Paper WP/98/135. The International Monetary Fund, Washington DC. 
Giavazzi F., T. Jappelli and M. Pagano (2000). “Searching for Nonlinear Effects of Fiscal Policy: 
Evidence from Industrial and Developing Countries”. NBER Working Paper No. 7460.  
Gupta Sanjeev, Benedict Clements, Emanuele Baldacci and Carlos Mulas-Granados (2005). “Fiscal 
Policy, Expenditure Composition and Growth in Low-Income Countries”. Journal of International 
Money and Finance, Vol. 24, 441-463.  
Gupta Abhijit (2007). “Determinants of Tax Revenue Efforts in Developing Countries”. IMF Working 
Paper WP/07/184. The International Monetary Fund, Washington DC. 
Hagemann Robert (1999). “The Structural Budget Balance: The IMF Methodology”. IMF Working 
Paper WP/99/95. The International Monetary Fund, Washington DC. 
Heller Peter, Richard Haas, and Ahsan Mansur (1986). “A Review of the Fiscal Impulse Measure.” 
IMF Occasional Paper No. 44. International Monetary fund, Washington DC. 
IMF (1987). “Theoretical Aspects of the Design of Fund-Supported Adjustment Programs”, IMF Occasional 
Paper No. 55, International Monetary Fund. 
IMF (2009a). “World Economic Outlook: Crisis and Recovery”, The International Monetary Fund. 
IMF (2009b). “World Economic Outlook: Sustaining the Recovery”, The International Monetary 
Fund, Washington DC. 
Jovanovic Boyan and Yaw Nyarko (1996). “Learning by Doing and the Choice of Technology”, 
Econometrica, 64(6): 1299-1310.   
Kasekende Louis, Zuzana Brixova and Leonce Ndikumana (2010). “Africa: Africa’s Counter-Cyclical 
Policy Responses to the Crisis”, Journal of Globalization and Development, Volume 1, Issue 1, Article 
16. 
Kneller R., M. F. Bleaney and N. Gemmell (1999). “Fiscal policy and Growth: Evidence from OECD 
Countries”, Journal of Public Economics, 74:171-190. 
Krugman Paul (2009). The Return to Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008. W. W. Norton & 
Company Ltd.   25
OECD (2009). World Economic Outlook, OECD, Paris, France. 
Pattillo Catherine, Sanjeev Gupta and Kevin Carey (2006). “Sustaining and Accelerating Pro-Poor 
Growth in Africa”. The International Monetary fund, Washington DC. 
Pindyck Robert and Daniel Rubinfeld (1998). Econometric Models and Economic Forecasts, Fourth 
Edition, Irwin and McGraw-Hill, New York. 
Rajan Raghuram and Arvind Subramanian (2008). “Aid and Growth: What Does the Cross-country 
Evidence Really Show?” The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 90, No. 4, pp. 643-665. 
Rodrik Dani (2006). “Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion? A Review of 
the World Bank Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform”, Journal of 
Economic Literature, Vol. XLIV, pp. 973-987.  
Sala-i-Martin Xavier (2002). “The Disturbing Rise of Global Income Inequality”. NBER Working 
Paper No. W8904. National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Spilimbergo Antonio, Steve Symansky, Olivier Blanchard and Carlo Cottarelli (2008). “Fiscal Policy for 
the Crisis”. IMF Staff Position Note, SPN/08/01. The International Monetary Fund. 
Steel William, Ernest Aryeetey, Hemamala Hettige and Machiko Nissanke (1997). “Informal Financial 
Markets under Liberalization in Four African Countries”. World Development, Vol. 25, No. 5, pp. 
817-830. 
Stiglitz Joseph (2002). Globalization and Its Discontents, W.W. Norton & Company Inc. New York, 
NY 10110. 
Tanzi Vito, Mario Blejer and Mario Teijeiro (1993). “Effects of Inflation on Measurement of Fiscal 
Deficits: Conventional versus Operational Measures”, in How to Measure Fiscal Deficit: Analytical and 
Methodological Issues, ed. By Mario Blejer and Adrienne Cheasty, International Monetary Fund. 
Tchundjang Pouémi Joseph (1979). « Monnaie, Servitude et Liberté : La Répression Monétaire de 
l’Afrique ». Edition Jeune Afrique Conseil. 
Williamson John (2000). “What Should the World Bank Think about the Washington Consensus?” 
World Bank Research Observer, 15(2): 251-64. 
World Bank (1990). “Making Adjustment Work for the Poor”, Social Dimensions of Adjustment Unit, 
Africa Region, The World Bank Group, Washington DC. 
World Bank (2003). Country Assistance Strategy for the Republic of Cameroon. Report No. 26555. 
Country Department 7, the Africa Region, The International Finance Corporation.  
World Bank (2005). Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform. Washington DC, The 
World Bank. 
World Bank (2006). “Debt Relief for the Poorest: An Evaluation Update of the HIPC Initiative.” 
World Bank Independent Evaluation Group. The World Bank Group. 
World Bank (2009). Third Trade and Competitiveness Development Policy Loan with Deferred 
Drawdown Option to The Republic of Mauritius. Report No. 46219-MU. Poverty Reduction and 

























1981 0.011 ‐0.015 ‐0.016 0.056 0.000 0.092 NA 0.012 ‐0.002 0.129 ‐0.022 ‐0.040 0.095 ‐0.063 ‐0.114 ‐0.160
1982 ‐0.054 ‐0.014 ‐0.025 0.083 0.000 ‐0.061 ‐0.143 ‐0.036 NA 0.045 ‐0.036 ‐0.012 0.083 0.018 ‐0.070 0.152
1983 ‐0.089 ‐0.052 0.055 0.086 0.000 ‐0.086 ‐0.109 ‐0.075 0.036 0.039 ‐0.077 0.055 ‐0.013 ‐0.002 ‐0.093 0.088
1984 ‐0.091 ‐0.027 0.104 0.047 0.000 0.071 ‐0.017 ‐0.048 ‐0.003 0.046 ‐0.037 ‐0.042 ‐0.021 0.026 ‐0.093 ‐0.119
1985 ‐0.041 0.010 0.169 0.033 0.000 0.010 0.021 ‐0.003 ‐0.014 0.052 ‐0.048 ‐0.157 ‐0.053 0.035 ‐0.104 ‐0.004
1986 ‐0.032 ‐0.004 0.194 0.040 ‐0.040 0.043 0.010 0.008 ‐0.010 0.038 ‐0.040 0.057 ‐0.110 ‐0.043 ‐0.015 ‐0.017
1987 ‐0.077 ‐0.052 0.157 0.080 ‐0.043 ‐0.130 ‐0.147 ‐0.043 ‐0.114 ‐0.050 ‐0.036 0.097 ‐0.122 ‐0.189 ‐0.042 ‐0.012
1988 ‐0.051 0.002 0.146 0.148 ‐0.037 ‐0.010 ‐0.171 0.002 ‐0.052 ‐0.111 ‐0.035 0.041 ‐0.112 0.013 0.022 ‐0.023
1989 ‐0.009 ‐0.058 0.096 0.076 ‐0.034 ‐0.012 ‐0.113 ‐0.011 ‐0.040 ‐0.048 ‐0.044 ‐0.034 ‐0.076 0.122 ‐0.021 0.002
1990 ‐0.041 0.055 0.104 0.030 ‐0.068 ‐0.066 ‐0.130 ‐0.051 ‐0.067 ‐0.094 ‐0.069 ‐0.006 ‐0.041 0.028 0.015 0.015
1991 ‐0.040 0.011 0.091 0.040 ‐0.084 ‐0.047 ‐0.112 ‐0.039 ‐0.061 ‐0.069 ‐0.061 ‐0.121 ‐0.022 0.028 0.010 ‐0.019
1992 ‐0.045 0.000 0.096 0.003 ‐0.079 ‐0.058 ‐0.119 ‐0.041 ‐0.058 ‐0.061 ‐0.050 ‐0.126 ‐0.052 ‐0.062 0.017 0.003
1993 ‐0.007 0.028 0.087 ‐0.004 ‐0.063 ‐0.040 ‐0.088 ‐0.041 ‐0.056 ‐0.062 ‐0.042 0.094 ‐0.057 0.015 0.011 0.003
1994 ‐0.022 ‐0.008 0.031 0.011 ‐0.076 0.013 ‐0.044 0.071 ‐0.080 ‐0.055 ‐0.055 0.014 ‐0.016 0.012 ‐0.024 0.004
1995 ‐0.030 0.031 0.023 0.022 ‐0.048 0.022 ‐0.037 0.017 ‐0.027 0.005 ‐0.028 0.038 0.028 0.024 ‐0.105 ‐0.065
1996 ‐0.003 0.014 0.067 0.035 ‐0.011 ‐0.090 ‐0.020 0.013 ‐0.036 0.021 ‐0.040 0.093 0.023 0.011 ‐0.100 0.030
1997 0.003 0.028 0.052 0.076 ‐0.016 0.048 ‐0.021 0.028 ‐0.031 0.022 ‐0.018 0.004 0.015 0.031 ‐0.065 0.008
1998 0.020 0.011 ‐0.037 0.087 0.000 0.017 ‐0.021 0.018 ‐0.036 0.022 ‐0.037 ‐0.071 ‐0.140 0.009 ‐0.024 0.030
1999 0.018 0.024 0.031 0.057 ‐0.005 0.018 ‐0.028 ‐0.006 ‐0.029 0.015 ‐0.088 0.029 0.012 ‐0.118 ‐0.035 0.030
2000 ‐0.017 0.019 0.074 0.070 ‐0.018 0.004 ‐0.013 ‐0.069 0.012 0.013 ‐0.093 0.028 0.116 ‐0.044 ‐0.014 0.016
2001 ‐0.014 0.021 ‐0.002 0.041 ‐0.009 ‐0.017 0.009 ‐0.019 0.026 0.017 ‐0.045 0.045 0.032 ‐0.004 ‐0.139 0.028
2002 ‐0.023 0.000 ‐0.034 0.051 ‐0.012 ‐0.026 ‐0.013 ‐0.032 0.007 ‐0.002 ‐0.076 ‐0.015 0.035 ‐0.027 ‐0.044 ‐0.059
2003 ‐0.019 0.020 ‐0.010 0.057 ‐0.033 ‐0.099 ‐0.022 ‐0.032 0.012 0.012 ‐0.070 ‐0.063 0.074 ‐0.001 ‐0.047 0.041
2004 ‐0.010 0.001 0.009 0.062 ‐0.022 ‐0.010 ‐0.017 0.001 ‐0.005 0.009 ‐0.030 0.066 0.083 ‐0.014 ‐0.057 0.042
2005 ‐0.025 0.000 0.067 0.050 ‐0.045 0.004 ‐0.017 0.000 0.036 ‐0.005 ‐0.044 0.091 0.086 0.005 ‐0.086 0.024
2006 ‐0.004 0.008 0.107 0.042 0.090 0.019 ‐0.018 ‐0.018 0.331 0.004 ‐0.039 0.082 0.092 ‐0.013 ‐0.063 0.038
2007 ‐0.004 0.010 0.082 0.061 0.016 0.021 ‐0.004 0.001 0.045 0.005 ‐0.031 0.081 0.087 0.029 0.029 0.042
Annex Table 1 ‐ Operational Balance and Growth





















1981 ‐0.084 ‐0.085 ‐0.054 0.004 ‐0.074 0.020 ‐0.054 0.004 ‐0.074 0.020 ‐0.120 0.161
1982 ‐0.044 ‐0.123 ‐0.043 0.014 ‐0.036 ‐0.099 ‐0.043 0.014 ‐0.036 ‐0.099 ‐0.158 ‐0.038
1983 ‐0.025 ‐0.098 ‐0.031 ‐0.019 ‐0.158 ‐0.195 ‐0.031 ‐0.019 ‐0.158 ‐0.195 ‐0.129 ‐0.078
1984 ‐0.022 0.032 ‐0.036 ‐0.019 ‐0.134 ‐0.088 ‐0.036 ‐0.019 ‐0.134 ‐0.088 ‐0.066 ‐0.047
1985 ‐0.029 0.024 ‐0.043 0.005 ‐0.097 ‐0.006 ‐0.043 0.005 ‐0.097 ‐0.006 ‐0.016 0.052
1986 ‐0.031 0.025 ‐0.042 0.032 ‐0.121 ‐0.035 ‐0.042 0.032 ‐0.121 ‐0.035 0.038 ‐0.120
1987 ‐0.023 0.022 ‐0.032 0.022 ‐0.072 0.128 ‐0.032 0.022 ‐0.072 0.128 ‐0.054 ‐0.143
1988 ‐0.026 0.051 ‐0.028 0.025 ‐0.065 0.071 ‐0.028 0.025 ‐0.065 0.071 ‐0.047 0.044
1989 ‐0.020 0.003 ‐0.034 0.011 ‐0.042 0.056 ‐0.034 0.011 ‐0.042 0.056 ‐0.027 0.034
1990 ‐0.021 0.007 ‐0.048 0.008 ‐0.061 0.002 ‐0.048 0.008 ‐0.061 0.002 0.030 0.091
1991 ‐0.013 0.027 ‐0.082 ‐0.017 ‐0.028 0.045 ‐0.082 ‐0.017 ‐0.028 0.045 0.007 ‐0.035
1992 ‐0.089 0.035 ‐0.106 ‐0.039 ‐0.026 ‐0.072 ‐0.106 ‐0.039 ‐0.026 ‐0.072 0.021 ‐0.023
1993 ‐0.099 0.023 ‐0.115 ‐0.028 ‐0.035 0.063 ‐0.115 ‐0.028 ‐0.035 0.063 ‐0.068 ‐0.006
1994 ‐0.089 0.007 ‐0.055 0.000 ‐0.054 0.032 ‐0.055 0.000 ‐0.054 0.032 ‐0.063 ‐0.018
1995 ‐0.064 0.014 ‐0.005 0.019 ‐0.033 ‐0.003 ‐0.005 0.019 ‐0.033 ‐0.003 0.034 ‐0.030
1996 ‐0.095 0.020 ‐0.010 0.017 ‐0.026 0.112 ‐0.010 0.017 ‐0.026 0.112 0.026 0.022
1997 ‐0.103 0.016 ‐0.016 ‐0.020 ‐0.028 0.081 ‐0.016 ‐0.020 ‐0.028 0.081 ‐0.010 0.000
1998 ‐0.081 0.021 ‐0.006 0.012 ‐0.019 0.092 ‐0.006 0.012 ‐0.019 0.092 ‐0.091 0.000
1999 ‐0.082 0.018 0.003 0.001 ‐0.009 0.061 0.003 0.001 ‐0.009 0.061 ‐0.052 ‐0.022
2000 ‐0.079 0.011 ‐0.006 ‐0.017 ‐0.052 ‐0.007 ‐0.006 ‐0.017 ‐0.052 ‐0.007 0.059 0.025
2001 ‐0.059 0.016 ‐0.021 0.021 ‐0.054 0.094 ‐0.021 0.021 ‐0.054 0.094 ‐0.053 0.051
2002 ‐0.044 0.019 ‐0.032 ‐0.018 ‐0.070 0.068 ‐0.032 ‐0.018 ‐0.070 0.068 0.008 0.165
2003 ‐0.033 0.026 ‐0.017 0.007 ‐0.042 0.044 ‐0.017 0.007 ‐0.042 0.044 ‐0.011 0.071
2004 ‐0.031 0.029 ‐0.001 0.025 ‐0.044 0.058 ‐0.001 0.025 ‐0.044 0.058 0.063 0.073
2005 ‐0.017 0.032 ‐0.017 0.037 ‐0.022 0.057 ‐0.017 0.037 ‐0.022 0.057 0.081 0.025
2006 ‐0.071 0.036 ‐0.025 0.042 ‐0.014 0.054 ‐0.025 0.042 ‐0.014 0.054 0.077 0.033
2007 ‐0.069 0.037 ‐0.032 0.050 ‐0.056 0.045 ‐0.032 0.050 ‐0.056 0.045 0.009 0.034










d'Ivoire Ethiopia Gabon Gambia Ghana Kenya Mozambique Nigeria Rwanda Senegal
Column 1C o l u m n  2C o l u m n  3C o l u m n  4C o l u m n  5C o l u m n  6C o l u m n  7C o l u m n  8C o l u m n  9C o l u m n  10 Column 11 Column 12 Column 13 Column 14
Constant 6.958 34.910 26.494 22.230 13.990 4.919 24.507 7.917 2.983 7.048 ‐10.471 ‐21.091 7.021 10.487
(1.999)* (2.927)*** (2.63)** (10.374)***(7.48)*** (3.158)*** (4.824)*** (7.898)*** (3.626)*** (‐2.384)** (‐0.622) (2.245)** (9.805)***
Government revenue per capita 
(in constant US$) 0.001 0.019 0.026 0.077 0.113 0.263 0.277 ‐0.005 0.006 0.065 0.169 ‐0.001 0.177 0.222
(0.02) (0.458) (1.524) (1.486) (2.869)** (4.308)*** (6.035)*** (‐0.074) (1.174) (2.424)** (‐0.032) (5.84)*** (1.853)*
Government expenditure per 
capita (in constant US$) ‐0.017 0.014 0.019 ‐0.013 0.010 ‐0.003 0.041 0.020 0.027 0.014 0.077 0.016 0.048 0.078
(‐0.985) (0.445) (1.405) (‐0.456) (0.543) (‐0.081) (2.812)** (0.642) (0.421) (0.822) (1.535) (0.864) (2.237)**
Private investment (in GDP) 0.072 0.125 0.051 0.037 0.039 0.010 ‐0.196 0.124 0.004 0.027 0.014 0.045 0.027 0.007
(3.727)*** (2.885)*** (1.767)* (0.698) (3.036)*** (1.287) (‐3.517)***(1.944)* (0.751) (1.348) (1.206) (0.562) (0.161)
Log of labor force 0.332 ‐1.603 ‐0.930 ‐0.776 ‐0.179 0.037 ‐0.853 ‐0.039 0.673 0.150 1.384 1.765 0.131 ‐0.078
(1.356) (‐2.173)** (‐1.487) (‐5.786)***(‐1.867)* (0.392) (‐2.192)** (‐0.536) (1.502) (4.291)*** (0.943) (0.617) (‐0.923)
AR(1) 0.860 0.985 0.874 0.598 0.495 0.160 0.875 0.180 ‐0.204 0.737 0.642 0.932 0.883 0.587
(10.498)*** (84.165)***(7.531)*** (1.853)* (1.985)* (0.586) (9.505)*** (0.677) (2.862)*** (2.784)** (11.409)*** (7.556)*** (1.824)*
MA(1) 0.139 0.959 0.997 ‐0.058 0.472 0.931 ‐0.997 0.221 1.602 0.360 0.173 0.445 ‐0.032 ‐0.183
(0.548) (20.923)***(9.808)*** (‐0.134) (1.755)* (17.952)***(‐13.782)**(0.599) (1.345) (0.557) (2.132)** (‐0.116) (‐0.439)













d'Ivoire Ethiopia Gabon Gambia Ghana Kenya Mozambique Nigeria Rwanda Senegal
Column 1C o l u m n  2C o l u m n  3C o l u m n  4C o l u m n  5C o l u m n  6C o l u m n  7C o l u m n  8C o l u m n  9C o l u m n  10 Column 11 Column 12 Column 13 Column 14
Constant 6.693 ‐21.985 7.531 22.642 18.079 4.495 16.511 8.034 2.459 7.315 ‐12.439 1.881 7.117 11.119
(2.199)** (‐8.323)***(11.312)***(11.415)***(16.239)***(3.494)*** (8.647)*** (9.394)*** (6.486)*** (3.529)*** (‐2.502)** (0.297) (1.991)* (3.737)***
Government expenditure per 
capita (in constant US$) 0.004 ‐0.098 0.04 0.007 0.025 0.276 0.014 ‐0.012 0.009 0.018 0.172 0.014 0.287 0.02
(0.152) (‐3.27)*** (2.092)* (0.213) (1.108) (3.886)*** (0.671) (‐0.241) (0.671) (0.53) (1.414) (1.757)* (4.22)*** (0.47)
Net lending per capita (in 
constant US$) 0.001 ‐0.001 ‐0.004 0.002 0 0.019 0.002 ‐0.003 ‐0.001 0.003 0.001 ‐0.008 0.007 ‐0.002
(1.246) (‐2.964)***(‐3.334)*** (1.172) (‐0.379) (3.758)*** (1.214) (‐0.793) (‐2.047)* (1.435) (0.35) (‐1.778)* (2.686)** (‐2)*
Private investment (in GDP) 0.059 0.193 0.347 0.075 0.06 0.012 0.049 0.121 0.004 0.064 0.02 0.086 0.06 0.032
(2.81)** (3.111)*** (19.39)*** (1.54) (2.726)** (1.055) (1.17) (2.072)* (0.784) (2.065)* (1.789)* (2.075)* (0.84) (0.932)
Log of labor force 0.344 2.342 0.078 ‐0.789 ‐0.384 0.053 ‐0.184 ‐0.031 0.725 0.147 1.563 0.46 0.064 0.067
(1.674) (11.046)***(2.233)** (‐6.34)*** (‐5.814)***(0.673) (‐1.444) (‐0.431) (22.514)***(1.243) (4.328)*** (1.262) (0.259) (0.333)
AR(1) 0.853 0.679 0.392 0.602 0.108 ‐0.144 0.251 0.236 ‐0.228 0.759 0.631 0.709 0.791 0.844
(10.969)***(3.514)*** (1.55) (1.574) (0.428) (‐0.613) (1.001) (0.919) (‐0.632) (3.29)*** (3.118)*** (3.588)*** (4.589)*** (4.599)***
MA(1) 0.151 0.997 ‐0.936 ‐0.161 0.94 0.941 0.937 0.33 0.769 0.328 0.282 0.641 ‐0.018 ‐0.092
(0.608) (13.184)***(‐6.548)*** (‐0.327) (9.27)*** (36.716)***(7.217)*** (0.901) (3.068)*** (1.174) (1.062) (3.364)*** (‐0.058) (‐0.3)












d'Ivoire Ethiopia Gabon Gambia Ghana Kenya Mozambique Nigeria Rwanda Senegal
Column 1C o l u m n  2C o l u m n  3C o l u m n  4C o l u m n  5C o l u m n  6C o l u m n  7C o l u m n  8C o l u m n  9C o l u m n  10 Column 11 Column 12 Column 13 Column 14
Constant 6.747 ‐18.476 6.706 22.847 17.56 5.76 18.977 8.301 2.391 7.523 ‐11.998 1.791 1.711 10.431
(2.042)* (‐13.276)***(6.066)*** (11.286)***(17.996)*** (13.14)*** (9.432)*** (5.527)*** (2.821)** (‐2.015)* (0.247) (0.714) (1.863)*
Government investment 
expenditure per capita (in 
constant US$) 0.038 ‐1.363 ‐6.388 0.51 1.013 0.589 1.595 ‐0.248 ‐0.015 0.082 ‐0 . 4 8 50 . 1 82 . 7 5 4 0 . 3 3 3
(0.155) (‐2.2)** (‐1.634) (0.859) (1.91)* (3.746)*** (‐0.607) (‐0.138) (0.197) (‐2.264)** (0.291) (3.227)*** (0.512)
Government other expenditures 
per capita (in constant US$) ‐0.015 ‐0.347 0.146 ‐0.128 ‐0.055 0.184 ‐0.121 ‐0.289 0.036 ‐0.024 ‐0.533 0.003 ‐0.188 ‐0.164
(‐0.093) (‐2.199)** (0.782) (‐0.639) (‐0.437) (‐1.445) (‐1.445) (0.365) (‐0.102) (‐2.877)*** (0.02) (‐0.416) (‐0.623)
Net lending per capita (in 
constant US$) 0.001 ‐0.002 ‐0.002 0.002 ‐0.001 0.01 ‐0.001 ‐0.005 ‐0.001 0.002 ‐0.001 ‐0.008 ‐0.001 ‐0.003
(0.887) (‐1.758)* (‐1.353) (1.057) (‐0.614) (‐0.609) (‐1.775)* (‐1.859)* (1.259) (‐0.674) (‐1.557) (‐0.193) (‐2.518)**
Private investment (in GDP) 0.064 0.173 0.421 0.064 0.08 0.032 0.05 0.133 0.004 0.055 ‐0.007 0.076 0.03 0.039
(2.807)** (3.107)*** (12.184)***(1.272) (3.911)*** (1.49) (2.539)** (0.768) (1.719) (‐1.05) (1.168) (0.404) (1.115)
Log of labor force 0.34 2.042 0.112 ‐0.792 ‐0.347 0.058 ‐0.362 ‐0.058 0.736 0.148 1.714 0.476 0.602 0.121
(1.543) (17.328)*** (2.046)* (‐5.989)***(‐5.588)*** (‐3.671)***(‐0.731) (24.104)***(0.927) (4.57)*** (1.131) (3.335)*** (0.333)
AR(1) 0.856 0.374 0.437 0.657 ‐0.297 0.313 0.109 0.264 ‐0.24 0.785 0.671 0.722 0.946 0.884
(10.031)*** (1.46) (1.555) (1.796)* (‐1.188) (0.422) (1.079) (‐0.609) (3.37)*** (4.462)*** (3.541)*** (25.318)*** (5.136)***
MA(1) 0.172 0.997 ‐0.919 ‐0.213 0.948 1.759 0.932 0.404 0.765 0.414 0.921 0.562 ‐0.942 ‐0.101
(0.656) (5.004) (‐8.767) (‐0.442) (9.381) (5.921) (1.229) (2.755) (1.591) (5.97) (2.827) (‐10.817) (‐0.331)












d'Ivoire Ethiopia Gabon Gambia Ghana Kenya Mozambique Nigeria Rwanda Senegal
Column 1C o l u m n  2C o l u m n  3C o l u m n  4 Column 5C o l u m n  6 Column 7C o l u m n  8 Column 9C o l u m n  10 Column 11 Column 12 Column 13 Column 14
Constant 6.447 29.834 8.877 22.05 14.125 4.874 27.915 7.79 2.845 6.69 ‐10.88 0.284 7.129 11.305
(1.896)* (3.204)*** (14.707)***(10.544)***(8.006)*** (3.072)*** (2.778)** (7.323)*** (7.259)*** (2.207)** (‐2.389)** (0.033) (2.341)** (9.486)***
Government revenue per capita 
(in constant US$) ‐0.031 0.009 0.037 0.058 0.119 0.254 0.198 0.016 0.03 0.06 0.206 ‐0.012 0.2 0.218
(‐0.515) (0.258) (1.706) (1.034) (2.96)*** (3.908)*** (3.025)*** (0.228) (2.307)** (1.167) (3.007)*** (‐0.304) (7.158)*** (2.043)*
Net lending per capita (in 
constant US$) 0.001 0 ‐0.005 0.001 0 0.001 0.002 ‐0.002 ‐0.001 0.002 ‐0.001 ‐0.008 ‐0.002 ‐0.003
(1.744)* (‐0.222) (‐6.257)*** (0.627) (0.558) (0.406) (0.963) (‐0.955) (‐3.844)***(1.421) (‐0.925) (‐1.564) (‐0.787) (‐2.981)***
Private investment (in GDP) 0.059 0.132 0.338 0.048 0.038 0.011 ‐0.09 0.113 0.003 0.036 0.01 0.064 0.027 0.016
(3.201)*** (3.325)*** (10.646)***(0.897) (2.967)*** (1.414) (‐1.274) (1.795)* (0.486) (1.089) (1.091) (1.482) (0.556) (0.374)
Log of labor force 0.385 ‐1.27 ‐0.001 ‐0.767 ‐0.185 0.041 ‐1.093 ‐0.023 0.686 0.176 1.447 0.574 0.141 ‐0.078
(1.615) (‐2.076)* (‐0.016) (‐5.848)***(‐2.014)* (0.432) (‐1.473) (‐0.297) (20.521)***(1.024) (4.667)*** (1.17) (0.677) (‐0.86)
AR(1) 0.862 0.983 0.468 0.629 0.48 0.173 0.904 0.222 ‐0.095 0.798 0.675 0.754 0.893 0.642
(11.898)*** (80.13)*** (2.468)** (1.785)* (2.02)* (0.636) (10.401)***(0.846) (‐0.405) (3.375)*** (3.31)*** (3.983)*** (8.077)*** (2.386)**
MA(1) 0.171 0.964 ‐0.997 ‐0.151 0.52 0.93 ‐0.997 0.277 0.94 0.411 0.109 0.568 ‐0.098 ‐0.1
(0.706) (24.943)***(‐7.778)*** (‐0.323) (2.118)** (18.604)***(‐7.946)***(0.764) (13.751)***(1.644) (0.327) (3.007)*** (‐0.363) (‐0.277)
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Annex Figure 2 - Mozambique: Different scenarios on Budget Allocation  
 
 
 
 